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INTRODUCTION  Plans  exist  in  various  ministries  of  the  govern-
ment  of Bolivia  to colonize new areas in the east, but
The  primary  purpose  of this paper  is  to provide  only  one  section  in that  region  is undergoing  signifi-
estimates  of the government  subsidy that would  have  cant change:  that south of the triangle  formed by the
to  be  paid  to wheat  producers  if  Bolivia  is  to reach  Rio  Grande  and  Ichilo  rivers,  which  includes  the
self-sufficiency  in  wheat.  These  estimates  are  then  provinces  of  Ibanez,  Santisteban,  Sara,  Warnes  and
utilized  in  a  producer's surplus  analysis  to  determine  Ichilo,  in  the  Santa  Cruz  department.  In  a  country
whether  or  not  such  a  policy  would  enhance  the  characterized  by  traditional  subsistence-type  agri-
economic  welfare of the country.  culture,  with  slow  and  limited  responses  to market
Bolivia  has a chronic deficit  in wheat production.  incentives,  the  Santa  Cruz  area  presents a contrasting
Imports composed  about  80  percent of consumption  picture of rapid  growth  and  high  response  to market
in  1971,  the  last  year  of  our  data  series  (Table  1).  incentives [1].
Domestic  production  in  1971  was  roughly  the  same  Wheat  production  in  Santa  Cruz  is  of negligible
as  14  years  earlier,  while  imports  have  steadily  importance  now,  but  technical  feasibility  has  been
increased.  A  linear  regression  of  imports  on  time  demonstrated  as  a winter rotation  crop  with cotton.
revealed  an  annual  increment  of  imports  of  7,748  "Adequate  yielding,  disease-tolerant,  well-adapted
metric  tons  (MT),  whereas  total  annual  consumption  varieties  are  available  and  sufficient  seed  can  be
increased  by  8,833  MT.  (Thus  increases  in  imports  produced.  There  is  enough  rainfall  for  an  average
have  supplied  about  88  percent  of  the  estimated  yield  of  1200  kilos  per  hectare.  Additionally,  in
increases  in  consumption.)  Requirements  of  foreign  rotation  with  cotton,  insect  problems  can  be
exchange  for  wheat  purchases  have  been  heavy,  reduced...  " [5].
especially  as  Public  Law  480  concessional  sales have  Government  policy  in  Bolivia  has been  directed
been  winding  down  and  Bolivia  has  had  to  turn  to  towards  domestic  production  of previously  imported
purely  commercial  transactions  to  satisfy  her  con-  agricultural  goods.  The  principal  justification  for
sumption requirements.  import  substitution  has  been  to  save  foreign  ex-
Efforts  have  been  made,  in  recent  years,  to  change.  This  policy  has  been  successful  with  sugar
introduce  hard  wheat varieties  and better production  cane  and  rice,  and  the  country  is  now self-sufficient
techniques  in  traditional  wheat producing  areas, but  in each.  The  next  government  target  appears to be at
results have not been very encouraging.  least  partial  elimination  of  the  wheat  production
It  has  been  noted  by  several  researchers  deficit.  At  the  same  time,  increasing  wheat  and/or
[4,  2,  5,  6]  that  any  significant  increase  in  wheat  flour  prices  to  dramatically  stimulate  production
production  would  most probably  have  to  come  from  response  is  a  potentially  explosive  political  issue
new  areas  opened  in the lowlands  of eastern  Bolivia.  because  of  the  high  fraction  of population  that  uses
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*This paper  is based  on a  section  of  the first author's  dissertation,  "Economic  Analysis of  the Agricultural Sector in Santa
Cruz, Bolivia,"  written at Utah State University,  1974.
79TABLE 1.  WHEAT PRODUCTION  AND IMPORTS  IN BOLIVIA, 1950-71
Imports
Production  Consumption  Percent  of  Total
Year  MT  MT  MT  Consumption . Consumption
1950  45,652  103,501  57,849  55.9
1951  31,326  109,172  77,846  71.3
1952  24,163  120,499  96,336  79.9
1953  20,581  107,593  87,012  80.9
1954  17,000  102,458  85,458  83.4
1955  17,000  81,573  64,573  79.2
1956  40,000  73,553  33,553  45.6
1957  45,000  186,573  141,573  75.9
1958  64,300  157,072  92,772  59.1
1959  62,260  175,644  113,384  64.6
1960  40,000  146,875  106,875  72.8
1961  35,000  179,340  144,340  80.5
1962  40,000  191,528  151,528  79.1
1963  55,200  216,092  160,892  74.5
1964  57,900  195,043  137,143  70.3
1965  55,000  220,571  165,571  75.1
1966  57,900  204,636  163,636  80.0
1967  27,000  229,665  202,665  88.2
1968  45,000  250,573  205,573  82.0
1969  53,000  244,905  191,905  78.4
1970  43,912  250,211  206,299  82.5
1971  61,029  291,086  230,057  79.0
SOURCE:  Gomez, Enrique et. al., "Estudio  del Trigo,"  Ministerio  de Agricultura y Ganaderia,  1972.
wheat  products  as its nutrient  staple  [4].  Every  new  ($b.)]  with  respect  to the  U.S.  dollar  in  1972,  the
government  that  comes  to power  continues  to keep  government  required  an  incentive  price  to be paid by
the  prices  of bread  and  flour far below world market  flour mills to wheat producers. In turn,  a subsidy was
levels.  In  this  analysis  it  is  assumed  that consumer  paid  to  millers,  since  the  flour  price  was  also
prices remain at these "low" levels.  controlled.  There  have  been  minor  changes  in these
After  the  67  percent  devaluation  of  Bolivian  payments  over  the  years,  but  the  character  of  the
currency  [the  monetary  unit  is  the  peso  boliviano  policy is unchanged since  1972.
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Two  wheat producing areas are  considered in this  / 
analysis:  the  traditional  areas,  mainly  in  the Central  \
Valleys  of  Bolivia,  and  the  newly  colonized  areas  in 
Santa  Cruz.  They  are represented  by the hypothetical 
supply  curves S1 and S2, respectively  (see  Figure  1).  PA  / 
The  total  supply  function  for  wheat  production  in 
Bolivia  is  S,  the  horizontal sum  of S 1 and  S2 at given  I  i  D
prices.  D  represents  the  domestic  demand  for wheat.  Q
To  reach  self-sufficiency  in  supply,  while  main-  0  QB1  QB2  QB
taining  the  current  pegged  demand  price  at  PA,  QB  FIGURE  1.  WHEAT  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND
must be  produced.  The  supply  price  of wheat  would  CURVES
have  to  be  PB  to  induce  QB.  At  price  PB,  QQB 1
would be  produced  in traditional  areas  and  QQB2  in  sloped  labor supply function with an elasticity of two
the Santa Cruz region.  was estimated for different wage  rates.
2
The  empirical  supply  function  for  traditional  Land  constraints  were  set  for  each  province  in
areas  was  derived  by  assuming unitary price  elasticity  the  region  that  reflected  total  land  available  for
and  taking  the 1971  estimate  of wheat production in  mechanized production  (cleared of tree stumps), total
Bolivia as  a base.'  land  presently  in  use,  and  finally  the  additional
The  potential  wheat  supply  function  for  the  amounts  of land  that  feasibly  could  be  brought  into
Santa  Cruz  area  was  obtained  by  means  of  a  linear  production  after  being  cleared.3 Maximum  produc-
program,  using  alternative  incentive  prices  paid  to  tion  constraints  were  placed  on  sugar cane  (based on
wheat  producers.  Physical  and  economic  data  were  present  milling  capacity),  on  rice  (based  on  total
collected  from  a  sample  survey  of  farmers  in  the  domestic  demand)  and  on  soybeans  (based  on
study  area.  Average  product  and  factor  prices  and  planned milling capacity).
farm  size  of  the  area  were  utilized.  The  objective
function  of the  linear program  to be maximized  was  WHEAT  SUPPLY RESPONSE  AND
expected  net  returns  accruing  to  agricultural  pro-  WELFARE ANALYSIS
ducers.  Coefficients  of  the  aij  matrix  were  derived  As the price  of wheat increased  parametrically  in
directly  from  sample  survey  data.  Operating  capital  the  model,  quantities  produced  increased  until  a
was  not  constrained  since  it  was  obtained  primarily  maximum  of  4.84  million  cwt.  (approximately
from  international  loans  that  appeared  to  be  ample  220,000  MT)  was  reached  at  the  $b.  100 cwt.  price
and available at favorable terms. A stepwise  positively-  (approximately  $3 per  bushel).
4 No  further response
Worldwide  estimates  of  supply  elasticity  for  wheat  production  have  been  compiled  by  Johnson  and  Krishna  [6,  7].
Johnson  reports  a  short-run  price  elasticity  of  supply  of  .7  to  1.3,  estimated  by  Hutchinson,  Naive  and  Tsu  for  Argentina,
Bolivia's  neighbor  on the  South.  Long-run  elasticities  tend  to  be  higher  as  do  those  for  more  advanced  countries.  Krishna's
estimates  tend  to  be  lower:  (1)  .31  for  rice  in  India during  1914-15  for  the short-run  and  .59  for  the long-run,  (2) for cotton
during  1948-61,  .64 in the  short-run  and  1.33 in the long-run,  and  (3) for wheat during 1914-43,  .08 in  the short-run and .14  in
the long-run.  The problem  with Krishna's wheat data is that  the time  period covered  was  pre-World War II, and elasticities were
acreage  responses to price  rather than output  responses.  Economic  theory would  suggest  that output  responses to  higher  prices
should be higher than acreage responses, since other inputs would presumably  be utilized more intensively.
2The  quantity  of locally  available  agricultural labor was  estimated to be 52,038 persons at the full employment  level. It  was
assumed that it  would  be available at current wages. Additional amounts could be attracted from other areas at higher wage rates.
Our best  estimates,  based  on information  from the area,  indicated that the  quantity of migrant labor available would increase in
steps  of 25,000  men  for  wage  increments of  $b. 1.00  per day.  (The  current exchange  rate  is $b.  20  for one  American  dollar.)
From  such  a  labor supply  schedule,  a marginal  factor  cost curve (MFC)  was  constructed.  Each increment  in hired labor would
mean higher  wages  not only  for the imported labor,  but for those already  working in the area.  Each point on the MFC  curve was
calculated  using the  equation:  MFC=P(1=1/E)  where  P  is  the  wage  rate  on the supply schedule,  and E is  the assumed  supply
elasticity.
Bolivia  is  a  country  where  about  80 percent  of  the  population  is  engaged  in  subsistence  farming,  with  many  densely
populated  agricultural  areas.  There must  be considerable  underemployment  of  agricultural labor.  Of course, to  move  this labor
from areas of current employment to the Santa Cruz region implies an increase in the wage rate.
The  total labor  supply  schedule  considered  was 250,000  persons, which  is  about 20 percent of the total agricultural labor
supply  in  the country.  It  was difficult for us to conceive conditions that would "pull" more workers than this into the new Santa
Cruz region, except  in the very long run.
3The  quantity  of  land  available  for mechanized  production,  including total land  presently  in use,  was  estimated basically
from  a production  survey  made by  the Office  of Statistics  of the Ministry  of Agriculture.  Figures on land that could be cleared
were estimated from soil maps published by the British Mission in Santa Cruz [3].
4 It  must  be emphasized  that we  are dealing  here  with  relative  prices;  i.e.,  when wheat  price  reaches $b.  100 and  all other
product  prices remain unchanged.  This note  of  caution is needed  because  nearly  all prices in Bolivia are currently rising rapidly.
The absolute  price for wheat has already risen above $b. 100 (September  1974) but relative price has not changed  as much.
81was  noted, even  if price  were increased  to $b.  150 per  TABLE  2.  WHEAT  SUPPLY  RESPONSE  TO  IN-
cwt.  (Table  2).  The  reason  is that  wheat production  CREASED  PRICES IN SANTA CRUZ
had  reached  the land  constraints  in  all five provinces.
Wheat  production  in  the  entire  country  was  Land  Presently  in  Use  Newly  Cleared  Land
a
Total
estimated  at  1,326,715  cwt.  in  1971  [6],  and  $b/cwt  Hectares  cwt  Hectares  cwt  Hectares  cwt
guaranteed  prices  paid  farmers  at  the  mills  were  70.12  24,483  489,667  ---  24,483  489,667
$b. 46.0  and  52.0  per  cwt.  for native and hard wheat  78.07  24,483  489,667  128,858  2,577,152  153,341  3,066,819
varieties,  respectively.  Total  consumption  was  80.00  24,483  489,667  128,858  2,577,152  153,341  3,066,819
8,045,400  cwt.,  however.  If  the  foregoing  analysis  is  85.00  22,999  459,980  131,072  2,621,439  154,071  3,081,419
valid,  it  appears  that  higher  incentive  prices  could  90.00  23,360  467,190  137,291  2,745,813  160,651  3,213,003
sharply  reduce  wheat  imports,  but  the  price  would  95.00  23,360  467,190  137,291  2,745,813  160,651  3,213,003
have to reach  "fantastic"  levels before self-sufficiency  100.00  50,519  1,010,374  191,705  3,834,094  242,224  4,844,468
could  be  attained.  It  must  be emphasized,  moreover,  150.00  50,519  1,010,374  191,705  3,834,094  242,224  4,844,468
that  it has not  been  demonstrated  that any increased
domestic  supply would be economically  efficient,  i.e.,  aIt  is  assumed  that  15  percent  of  this  land  will  be
benefits  of  the  incentive  price  program  would  more  cleared annually until the maximum available  level is reached.
than offset the costs.
Proceed  with  the  welfare  analysis  of  such  a
program.  After  deductions  were  made  for hectolitric  The  situation  is  depicted  in  Figure  2.  Assume
weight  and  impurities,  it  was  estimated  that average  consumer  price  is fixed and that total  demand at that
price  received  by  wheat  producers  in  Santa  Cruz  price  is  also  fixed.  Also,  assume  that  the  supply
department  was $b.  46.75 per cwt.  in 1971.  curves  for traditional  wheat areas  and the Santa Cruz
After  the  67  percent  devaluation  of currency  in  area are  as shown.
1972,  it  was  estimated  that  domestic  factor  prices  The  derived  demand  curve  facing  Santa  Cruz
increased  by  about  40  percent  by  the  end  of  the  producers  can  be  regarded  as  total demand minus the
following  year.  It  is  roughly  estimated  that  the  supply  from traditional areas,  yielding the Santa Cruz
general  price  level  of the economy  had  increased  by  demand  as shown.  Santa Cruz  supply and demand  do
about  50  percent  at  the  time  of  the  study  (June  not  intersect  because  of  constraints  put  on  land  in
1973).  Presumably,  the  price  of wheat had followed  wheat,  as  previously  explained.  This  gives  rise  to
this  trend  in inflation (50  percent increase),  i.e.,  from  skepticism about  Bolivia's  ability  to  be self-sufficient
$b.  46.75  to $b. 70.12  per  cwt.  Therefore,  the  1971  in wheat.
estimate  of domestic  wheat production was probably  Suppose,  however,  that  by  removing  land  con-
produced  at  the  adjusted  relative  price  of $b.  70.12  straints the  supply  curve  moves  along the dotted line
cwt.  after devaluation.  in  Figure  2  until  it  intersects  demand  at  a  price  of
As  explained earlier,  a land constraint was put on  $b.  150.5 If  the  government  desires  to  maintain  a
wheat  production  in the  new  provinces  as  a first cut.  constant  relative  wheat  price  of  $b.  70.12  per  cwt.
For  purposes  of viewing whether  self-sufficiency  is a  for consumers  (which  is also  assumed  to be the price
"reasonable"  goal,  those  constraints  still seem  fairly  of imported wheat),  while attaining self-sufficiency  in
realistic.  If so,  it seems  hopeless  for Bolivia  to think  production,  the  subsidy  to producers  would  have to
in terms of self-sufficiency  in wheat production  in the  cover  the  gap  between  $b. 150.0  and  $b. 70.12  per
near  future,  especially  if consumer  prices  are pegged  cwt.  In consequence,  a  subsidy of $b.  79.88 per cwt.
far  below  free-market  levels.  In order to address  the  (113.92  percent  of  the  consumer  price)  would  be
question  of  whether  or  not  supply  response  to  needed  to  raise  domestic  production  to  8,045,400
incentive  prices  is  economically  efficient,  however,  cwt.  This  would  require  a  subsidy  payment  of
liberalize  the  constraints  on land  as it  becomes more  $b.  642.66 million annually.
and  more  profitable  to produce  wheat  as its  relative  Since the wheat supply curve for traditional  areas
price  rises.  This  may require  that  other crops will  be  had  been  assumed  unitary  elastic,  quantity  supplied
displaced  by  wheat  and/or  that  newly-cleared  land  from  that  area  at  $b.  150  would  increase  also  by
will  be  brought  into  production  in  still  other  pro-  113.92 percent, or from 1,326,715 to 2,838,109 cwt.
vinces in the Santa Cruz area.  The  gain  in  producer's  surplus  in  the  traditional
5 This assumption  permits us to  force self-sufficiency  at an incentive price of $b.  150. We can then proceed to determine the
welfare  implications.  The choice  of an intersection  price of $b.  150.  is no doubt  arbitrary,  but implies an elasticity  of supply  of
about .025 which does not seem unreasonable  given the difficulty  of bringing new acreage into production.
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FIGURE  2.  WHEAT  DEMAND  AND  SUPPLY  ESTIMATES  WHEN  A PRICE  SUBSIDY  TO CONSUMERS  IS
IN EFFECT
areas  would  be  approximately  116.34  million  of  estimated to be 252.50 million pesos bolivianos.s The
pesos  bolivianos,  calculated  as  follows:  total  gain  in  producer's  surplus  in  the  Santa  Cruz
($b.79.88X1.327  million cwt.)+($b.79.88X1.51  mil-  area,  resulting  from the wheat  price  rise of $b.  70.12
lion cwt.)/2.  to  150.0  per  cwt.,  is  thus  139.11+252.50=391.61
The  gain  in producer's surplus  in the  Santa Cruz  million pesos bolivianos.
area  is composed  of two  parts. First, it is represented  To  assess  the  overall  impact  of price subsidy  on
by  increase  in  total  net  returns  to  agricultural  total  welfare,  government  expenditure  of  642.66
producers,  as  wheat  prices are  raised  from $b.  70.12  million  pesos  bolivianos9 must  be  weighed  against
to $b.  100 per  cwt.;6  that  is,  the  increase  in value  of  total  gain  in  producer's  surplus,  both  in  traditional
the  objective  function  in  the  linear  program.7 The  areas  and  in  Santa  Cruz  ($b. 391.61+166.34=
value  of the objective function increased  from 704.61  557.95 million).
to 843.72  million pesos  bolivianos, representing a net  No  change  in consumer  surplus  exists,  since  real
increase of 139.11 million pesos bolivianos.  Secondly,  price  to  consumers  and  quantity  consumed  are
the  remainder  of  the  producer's  surplus  captured  in  assumed  to  be  the  same  with  price  subsidy  to
the  Santa  Cruz  area  is  calculated  geometrically  by  producers  as without it. Net social cost of implement-
moving  along the  assumed  supply  curve  (dotted  line,  ing a program of self-sufficiency  in wheat production,
Figure  2)  as  the price  is increased  from  $b. 100.0  to  without  an  increase  in  price  paid  by  consumers,  is
$b.  150.0  per  cwt.  This  gain  in producer's  surplus is  estimated  by  subtracting  total  gain  in  producer
6It  is  assumed  that  after  the  price  reaches  $b.  100,  the  supply curve takes the  shape of the broken  line  in Figure 2,  and
proceeds  until  it  intersects the  demand at  price $b.  150.  This assumption  is consistent  with the conclusion reached  earlier that
there is no further acreage response after the price reaches $b.  100 (see Table 2).
7Net returns to  agricultural producers  represent the  revenues  remaining after  all input purchases  have been  covered.  Thus,
the  value  of the objective  function  is similar  in  concept  to  rent accruing to  the resources owned by the  farmer  and  producer's
surplus as traditionally  defined.
8This calculation was made as  follows: [(4.8 million cwt.x$b.50)+(.5 million cwt.x$b.50)]  /2.
9Calculated as [($b.150-$b.70.12)x8.0454  million cwt.].
83surplus  from  government  expenditures  for  the price  considered  along  with  changes  in producer surplus in
subsidy:  642.66-557.95=84.71  million  pesos  order  to  arrive  at  an  efficiency  optimum.  Thus,
bolivianos.  elasticity  of  demand  would  also  be  of  crucial
The  conclusion  is  that  if  the  government  is  importance.
determined  to maintain  "low"  wheat  prices  to con-  Finally,  this  analysis  was  completed  before  the
sumers,  costs  of  a  subsidy  to induce  national  wheat  "huge"  increases  in  world  price  of  food  grains
production  self-sufficiency  seem  to  be  greater  than  occurred.  At the time  of the study, consumer  wheat
benefits  to  wheat  growers  in  the  form  of  producer  prices  in  Bolivia  were  reasonably  close  to  world
surplus arising from the subsidy.  prices.  The  current  situation  has  not  been  carefully
This  analysis  neglects  several  important  factors,  studied,  but consumer prices utilized in this study are
however.  One set  of issues relates  to income  distribu-  equivalent  to  prices  of  about  $2  per  bushel.  World
tion. If the government  collects  revenues used to pay  prices  are  currently  much  higher.  The  opportunity
the  subsidy  to  "poor"  farmers  from  "rich"  mer-  cost  to  the Bolivian  economy  of supplying  domestic
chants,  landholders,  etc.,  then  income  distribution  wheat  is  world  price.  Given  high  world  price,  the
"gains"  might  well  offset  efficiency  "losses"  of  the  Bolivian  government  may  well  subsidize  some  in-
subsidy  program.  Alternatively,  there  is no  reason  to  creases  in  domestic  production  more  cheaply  than
assume  that  present  consumer  prices  and  buying  wheat  in world  markets. In  fact, the  price  of
consumption  are  optimum.  If  prices  to  consumers  $b.  150  per  cwt.  (or  $4.50  per  bushel)  needed  to
were  allowed to rise, then consumption would decline  stimulate  large  supply  increases  suggested  in  this
and  losses  of  consumer  surplus  would  have  to  be  study, is not far above recent world wheat prices.
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